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In this paper I would like to talk about prerequisites for a possible concept of truth to 
be derived from Sartre’s system of phenomenological ontology. He himself does not 
provide us with a consistent concept of truth, but thoughts on truth appear throughout 
his work, so that it seems worth contemplating their weight. I am going to pursue this 
goal through three main argumentative steps. Firstly: truth cannot reside within a 
simple subject|object binary, as Heidegger has shown. Secondly: truth nevertheless 
needs to be placed within a relation that must, despite all the dangers that lie on this 
Introductory Remarks 
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way of thinking, ‘include’ a structure of otherness which, at the same time, must not 
be inclusive. Thirdly: this relation must in its very essence be a relation between 
subjects, where in order to understand this relation we need to re-establish the subject-
object binary while simultaneously trying to find a way of thinking it that does not fall 
back behind Heidegger’s achievements.  
In order for something to be true or false, it must find itself in some kind of relation; 
otherwise it just is, but is neither true nor false. But what kind of relation, and what or 
who are the relata? One of the most traditional and, at Heidegger’s time, still most 
common answers to this question, was that truth resides within the relation between 
thought and sensation, absolute reality and appearance, or, the most general, subject 
and object – the correspondence theory of truth. Truth would then be found wherever 
one side ‘agrees’ with the other.  
The Problem of the Subject|Object Relation 
But how, asks Heidegger in his 1930 lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, as well as 
already in Sein und Zeit1, can the subject ever agree with an object when both are 
defined by a total difference that makes them repel each other, even within a 
dialectical frame? How could the subject and the object be brought near to each other, 
let alone agree with each other, if they are defined by not having anything in 
common? Truth, as Heidegger says, has been confused with Richtigkeit (as 
correctness) and has thus been mistaken for a sich-richten-nach (as conforming to): in 
realism the subject was supposed to conform to the object, in idealism the object to 
the subject. But truth cannot be about one side of a dualism having to subordinate to 
the other; that would be, put bluntly, a mere act of power, or even violence, and does 
not reveal what is. 
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The problem of the question of truth within the subject|object binary can be traced 
back to the ontological problem of the binary opposition that constitutes the subject as 
a dynamic, meaningful structure. If its relation to an abstract outer world, or to a 
sphere of objects, is the main determining relation that the subject has – such that it is 
what the subject ontologically first encounters and what thus determines the subject as 
a subject – then it is very hard to understand how the subject could possibly recognize 
other subjects within that outer world or behind particular objects. What would 
enable the subject to decide behind which objects ‘more’ is to be found? The structure 
as such does not deliver any rule that would allow for the positing of another 
subjective structure beyond the objectivity that my own subjectivity faces. 
The Ontological Problem of the Subject|Object Binary 
The distinction between a ‘mere’ object and an object that is ‘also’ a subject seems to 
be impossible on this understanding. With the premise of the total difference between 
subject and outer world, we could only rescue other subjects by introducing a Kantian 
intelligible sphere in which transcendental subjects are somehow intertwined by 
virtue of a pre-spatiotemporal constitutional connection; however, that would still be 
an attempt to think other subjects in the manner of a simple, absolute difference. I will 
get back to what I mean by ‘simple total difference.’ Following Heidegger, we cannot 
begin from a binary that is based upon exclusion or a total difference because truth 
cannot reside within a relation whose relata are indifferent to each other and thus 
convertible. So we have to start with something else. The question is: with what?  
Sartre’s answer is that the basis for any possible relation between the subject and a 
thing, however that relation might be construed, is the subject’s ontologically primary 
and ineluctable relation to other subjects. Any instance of truth that resides between 
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the subject and a thing can only reside there because there is another subject on the 
other end of that relation, ‘beyond’ the thing. If this were not the case, that thing 
would not be of any concern to the subject. I think it is obvious that Sartre picks up on 
Heidegger’s concept of Zuhandenheit here, for Zuhandenheit also both mediates and 
is mediated by others. The crucial difference is, however, that for Sartre the ground of 
the structure is an actual direct and primary mutual dependency of subjects in the 
foundation of (all the modes of) their Being rather than a reference2: “The Other is the 
indispensable mediator between myself and me”.3 Whatever resides between them or 
is not a subject only resides there as a somewhat meaningful entity because of the way 
this mutual dependency is structured. I will now briefly outline this structure. 
Sartre’s main ontological argument about the intertwinement of subjects has two 
crucial aspects. It says that firstly we need a concrete structure of otherness – of 
something which is not always already somehow understood – in order to be able to 
understand the subject as a dynamic structure (and it cannot be understood otherwise), 
but that secondly this structure of otherness cannot be totally outside of the subject in 
the Cartesian sense, for then we would fall back behind Heidegger’s achievements. 
The intricacy here obviously lies in the paradox of having to provide a structure of 
something that is, by virtue of this its very structure, outside of any structure ‘I’ could 
ever talk about. This seems – and probably is – an impossible task. The point is, 
however, that the impossibility of thinking it does not dispense us from the 
responsibility of attempting it anyhow; this task that other French authors, such as 
Lévinas and Blanchot, have taken much further and more radically is thus also 
already the basis of Sartre’s thought. His solution is to make use of the traditional 
The Subject-Subject-Relation 
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subject|object binary, but to intertwine it in a complex difference instead of a simple 
one. 
For Sartre, the object is, ontologically first and foremost, an aspect of the subject; 
however, and this is crucial, it cannot be grounded in the very subject of which it is an 
aspect, or at least not solely in it. There must be something to the object that lies 
outside of the subject, for the obvious reason that otherwise the object would collapse 
back into the subject. So far, Sartre is a Kantian. But for Sartre, on the other end of 
the object is neither a thing-in-itself nor ‘the’ (absolute) subject, instead it is another 
subject. Objectivity does not come into play when a sole subject faces or constructs an 
object (that kind of ‘simple’ dualism cannot serve as constitutive for the subject, as I 
have very briefly indicated already), but rather when the subject realizes that it is 
being objectified; put in Cartesian terms, that it itself is or belongs to an outer world – 
for another subject. It can only be objectified, however, if there is an actual other 
subject on the other end of the relation (an object can only be an object for a subject). 
As objects, subjects are part of my world; as subjects, in their subjectivity, they are 
not. The ontologically critical aspect of this argument is that other subjects cannot 
first occur as objects – in the sense of an ‘absolute’ subject facing a world of objects 
and then trying to distinguish ‘mere’ objects from objects that are ‘also’ subjects – 
since there is no way of explaining how the subject would be able to identify another 
subject behind a certain object. That is, unless it is already somehow ontologically 
connected to that subject before it is even able to see it as an object. There is no way 
that objective (empirical, sensual) data as such could lead to recognizing another 
subject; starting with objects as the subject’s ontological counterpart, all that would be 
possible is to assume other subjects behind certain objects. However, that could never 
be more than a random act from which any number of subjects might well be 
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excluded. Truth, in its fullest sense, cannot reside in a random relation. Such a 
random relation is unable to constitute its relata and thus cannot take its own weight – 
neither phenomenologically nor ontologically.  
The object is not the total outside (‘outer world’) of the subject for it can only exist 
for a subject, thus it must be a part of the subject somehow. But it cannot be a part of 
one subject alone; a single (absolute) subject would not have any inducement to place 
itself towards or against an object.  
Sartre makes use of the Hegelian terminology of for-itself (pour-soi) and in-itself (en-
soi) to portray this complex interplay. The pour-soi holds the subjective moment of 
the structure, which is defined as precisely that which is “…what it is not and which is 
not what it is”
The pour-soi and the en-soi 
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The en-soi on the other hand is what Sartre defines as that which always already is 
what it is. In relation to the pour-soi as the subjective moment of the relation, the en-
soi holds the objective moment that the pour-soi determines itself against. The en-soi 
has the function of a mediator between one pour-soi and another: as soon as an Other 
appears, I am put into the position to see myself as an object (as an en-soi), because 
that is how I realize the Other sees me. However, “this object which has appeared to 
the Other is not an empty image in the mind of another. Such an image in fact, would 
be imputable wholly to the Other and so could not ‘touch’ me.”
; if it were already what it is, it would not be a subjective structure for 
it would not have any inducement to aim anywhere.  
5 We have already 
seen that the subject cannot found on its own being an object (in the Cartesian sense 
of it constructing an object), but neither can it in isolation found an Other to be an 
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object for it, or, the other way around, neither can its being-an-object be founded on 
another subject alone. If it could then once again subject and object would have 
nothing to do with each other and the subject’s being an object for an Other would not 
even concern it. The object belongs to both subjects that are part of the relation. This 
is where Sartre’s concept of shame comes into play, along with his concept of the 
glance: “Shame is by nature recognition. I recognize that I am as the Other sees me.”6 
Not only shame but also the task of accepting the en-soi occurs between myself and 
the Other through recognition – that en-soi becoming a part of myself as a Being for 
the Other that I must make sense of.7
The task of having to make sense of how the Other sees me and to incorporate it into 
my self-understanding does not contradict what I have said and quoted before: that the 
pour-soi determines itself by refusing to be the en-soi. The en-soi is and remains a 
permanent and somewhat absurd task; the pour-soi can as such never fully merge into 
it, just as the subject can never fully ‘agree’ with the object, as we saw at the 
beginning. But Sartre draws another conclusion than Heidegger. For Sartre, the 
subject|object binary is not a problem of a too narrow cognition or logic (just as the 
Other is not a problem or question of cognition), such that it could be overcome by 
dissolving it into another kind of thought or by abandoning the kind of being-with-
others that reveals this structure.  
 
For him, this structure must perpetually be thought even though it might turn out to be 
impossible or absurd. Sartre thus draws the subject|object binary as a more complex 
interweaving than is traditional – portraying it as an ontologically detectable fact of 
intersubjectively founded existence that cannot be overcome, even though – as 
Heidegger also urged – it shall be overcome. This impossible ‘shall’ is, paradoxically, 
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what keeps the structure in motion and thus subjective. 
Sartre in fact performs a minor Copernican revolution by turning the totalizing act 
upside down: my task is not to permanently objectify the Other and thereby constitute 
and affirm my own Being as an absolute subject. On the contrary, my task is to 
recognize that I am always weaker than the Other. And even that is, thinking Sartre a 
little further, too simple: it is possible that both subjects of a particular relation are 
weaker than the other at the same time – there is no arbitrator who could make that 
judgment other than the two subjects in question and they can only speak for 
themselves. Logical principles do not necessarily apply to existential matters. Sartre 
makes the two parts of a difference oscillate in such a way that they can no longer be 
‘simply’ distinguished. They are equal and at the same time never equal, both, even 
though that seems to be a contradiction, because they are subjects. It is impossible for 
an observer to see or think them other than in an uncertainty relation.  
Having to make sense of how the Other sees me and to incorporate it into my self-
understanding means that truth is something that I have to want and grasp: it is neither 
eternal (because no en-soi could ever exhaust the pour-soi) nor always already there 
ready to be uncovered – it is made. I do, however, have the choice to ignore it: “The 
condition of there being truth is the perpetual possibility of refusing it.”
Truth and Freedom 
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Truth is, thus, a possibility and not a necessity – this notion once again turns the 
traditional narrative upside down. It is a possibility not in the sense that truth itself 
would be arbitrary, but rather in the sense that it can be grasped or not grasped: its 
condition must be freedom. However, it cannot be a merely negative freedom in the 
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sense of a choice between “two or several external possibles with one being in 
external indifference towards the other”9: this would be the kind of impossible 
freedom that a subject facing mere objects and nothing else would have. Instead, 
freedom must have some kind of a direction. Without something towards which it is 
aiming it is arbitrary, and it is this direction that for Sartre is provided by the Other 
since it is only through the Other that the en-soi occurs in the first place. The en-soi is 
what carries truth and what can be grasped or not grasped; but the en-soi can never be 
detached from the two subjects between which it occurs. To be more precise (and 
more vague at the same time), one has the choice for or against truth, but freedom has 
always already picked truth.  
Many questions remain. Are there ‘levels’ of truth? Does its content increase the more 
subjects a particular truth ‘belongs’ to, which would be the common definition of 
objectivity – in other words: is something more ‘true’ the more ‘objective’ it is? Or 
rather the other way around? These questions do not belong to the range of issues 
Sartre explicitly deals with while contemplating truth. His thoughts on truth are 
fragmentary and appear unsystematically in L’être et le néant and in Verité et 
existence, a book that Sartre never finalized for publication. 
Concluding remarks 
However, there is one extremely important thought to be discerned here whose value 
far outweighs Sartre’s lack of an elaborate and systematic position, a thought that 
seems to have been largely forgotten in philosophy and that Sartre can help us 
reinvent. This thought is that truth cannot be disconnected from, but must remain 
bound to the subject’s ontological ‘birth’ (which cannot be accessed but only 
indicated through phenomenological inquiry). This is basically an old thought – what 
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constitutes the subject ontologically must be understood as its responsibility; 
however, with Sartre this is not construed in the metaphysical or theological sense of 
an extramundane Absolute that human being ought yet inevitably fails to accomplish. 
Rather, in Sartre it is responsibility in the sense of a mundane structure of otherness 
that cannot be resolved as such, because it is the structure of subjectivity (pour-soi) 
that precedes any objectification – be it my own or that of the Other. It can only be 
resolved in its objective realizations (en-sois) that always remain preliminary and 
temporary. They serve as the mediating and determining ‘Between’ of subjects – as 
this ‘Between,’ they are the instance that carries truth, but without absolute or eternal 
truth for no objectification (en-soi) can ever exhaust the subject (the pour-soi). At 
least a hint on one of the questions raised above can be given here: truth, in its widest 
and most primary weight, is not about being as ‘objective’ as possible, but about 
being as honest as possible; truth is thus rather about ethical values than 
epistemological ones. But what that means precisely will have to be discussed 
elsewhere. 
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